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Abstract
Background: Influenza viruses are a major cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide. Vaccination remains a
powerful tool for preventing or mitigating influenza outbreaks. Yet, vaccine supplies and daily administration
capacities are limited, even in developed countries. Understanding how such constraints can alter the mitigating
effects of vaccination is a crucial part of influenza preparedness plans. Mathematical models provide tools for
government and medical officials to assess the impact of different vaccination strategies and plan accordingly.
However, many existing models of vaccination employ several questionable assumptions, including a rate of
vaccination proportional to the population at each point in time.
Methods: We present a SIR-like model that explicitly takes into account vaccine supply and the number of
vaccines administered per day and places data-informed limits on these parameters. We refer to this as the non-
proportional model of vaccination and compare it to the proportional scheme typically found in the literature.
Results: The proportional and non-proportional models behave similarly for a few different vaccination scenarios.
However, there are parameter regimes involving the vaccination campaign duration and daily supply limit for
which the non-proportional model predicts smaller epidemics that peak later, but may last longer, than those of
the proportional model. We also use the non-proportional model to predict the mitigating effects of variably timed
vaccination campaigns for different levels of vaccination coverage, using specific constraints on daily administration
capacity.
Conclusions: The non-proportional model of vaccination is a theoretical improvement that provides more accurate
predictions of the mitigating effects of vaccination on influenza outbreaks than the proportional model. In addition,
parameters such as vaccine supply and daily administration limit can be easily adjusted to simulate conditions in
developed and developing nations with a wide variety of financial and medical resources. Finally, the model can
be used by government and medical officials to create customized pandemic preparedness plans based on the
supply and administration constraints of specific communities.
Background
Influenza viruses continue to be a major cause of hospi-
talizations and deaths worldwide due to annual seasonal
epidemics [1-6] and less-frequently occurring, but
potentially more severe, pandemics [3,4,7-9]. Vaccina-
tion is one of the best tools health professionals have to
prevent or mitigate influenza outbreaks [9,10]. Each
year, vaccines are developed based on predictions about
which influenza strains are likely to be circulating [9,11],
and distributed prior to and during the influenza season.
When there is good correspondence between the vac-
cine strains and the circulating strains, vaccination pro-
grams are highly effective in decreasing influenza-related
hospitalizations and deaths, particularly in high-risk
groups such as the elderly and children [12-14]. Vacci-
nation prior to the first outbreak of a pandemic is
usually not possible, due both to the unexpected nature
of these outbreaks and the novelty of the viral strain
responsible [7-9]. However, many influenza pandemics
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are characterized by multiple waves separated by
months or years, which can allow time for vaccination
development and administration in an attempt to miti-
gate subsequent outbreaks [15-19]. Unfortunately,
resources are limited and many countries already strug-
gle with insufficient doses of vaccines, as well as
shortages in medical supplies, facilities, and workers to
administer vaccines [20-22]. Resource limitations are
likely to be even greater, and more widespread, in the
case of a pandemic [8,20,22-24]. Even in the case of ade-
quate resources, administration capacity is still limited;
medical staff and facilities can only give a maximum
number of vaccines per day [25-30], and that number
may be small relative to the size of the population
under consideration.
Understanding how vaccination resources can affect
the size and dynamics of influenza outbreaks is crucial
to outbreak preparedness [9]. Yet, many modeling stu-
dies examining the effectiveness of vaccination in miti-
gating outbreaks are based on questionable assumptions
about supply and administration of vaccines. First, the
assumed vaccine stockpiles are often very large relative
to the size, and sometimes the location, of the consid-
ered population [31-34]. Second, previous studies mod-
eling vaccination during a pandemic assume that
vaccines are administered only to susceptible individuals
[33,35-40]. This is problematic for several reasons. For
one, medical professionals are rarely able to determine
an individual’s epidemiological status (i.e. susceptible,
infected, recovered) prior to vaccination. Laboratory
testing of individuals seeking vaccination is not required,
nor recommended, for general use or clinical decision-
making [41]. Also, individuals may not be aware of their
own epidemiological status, either because they are
asymptomatic or are unsure that an illness they recently
experienced was due to the virus in question. Therefore,
the only individuals who are likely not to seek or receive
vaccination are those who are infected and symptomatic,
and it is possible that many individuals with existing
immunity get vaccinated. Considering only the suscepti-
ble population may underestimate the overall number of
vaccines used, including those that are potentially
wasted, during a vaccination campaign [42]. Finally, the
administration of vaccines is usually modeled by specify-
ing that a proportion of the population is vaccinated per
day [31-40,43-48]. Such proportions may represent a
very small or large number in comparison to the num-
ber of vaccines that can reasonably be administered on
a daily basis. Although fixed-rate vaccination models
exist (e.g. [49]), the formulations of which we are aware
are not based on daily administration constraints. In
practice, vaccination clinics are planned and run based
on the number of people that can be vaccinated per day,
given the availability and capacity of equipped facilities
and medical professionals [25-30]. The concern is that
modeling based on the assumptions discussed above
may lead to innaccurate conclusions about the effects of
vaccination programs on the size or progression of
influenza outbreaks.
We developed an epidemiological model to investigate
the spread of influenza that incorporates realistic con-
straints on vaccine supply and administration capacity.
Our model allows the simulation of specific limits on
the total number of vaccines available, the number that
can be administered per day to a single population, the
relative supply to different epidemiological classes, and
the effects of the timing and duration of vaccination
campaigns. Wherever possible, the values of these para-
meters were based on real and simulated data (see
Table 1) from sources such as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO), the Macroepidemiology of Influenza
Vaccination (MIV)
Study Group, and a variety of international researchers
studying vaccine supply and administration. The vaccina-
tion parameters in our model can also easily be adjusted
by public health officials or communities looking to
examine the mitigating effects of vaccination given their
specific supply and administration constraints.
We refer to our model as the non-proportional model
of vaccination, since the administration of vaccines is
limited by a daily maximum number rather than a pro-
portion of the population, and compare the results to
those obtained when vaccination is implemented using a
proportional scheme. The results show that though the
proportional and non-proportional models predict simi-
lar epidemics for a few different vaccination scenarios,
there are regimes under which important differences in
the dynamics of the two models are observed. Specifi-
cally, given particular combinations of vaccination cam-
paign duration and daily supply limit, the proportional
model predicts epidemics with larger final sizes and ear-
lier peak times than those predicted by the non-propor-
tional model. In addition, the proportional model
predicts epidemics that last days less than in the non-
proportional model. We argue that the non-proportional
model provides more accurate information about the
vaccine stockpiles and human resources needed to deal
with real influenza outbreaks. Furthermore, our model
can be used by government and medical officials to cre-
ate customized pandemic preparedness plans based on
the resources available to their specific communities.
Methods
Assumptions of the model
We developed a SIR-like epidemiological model to study
the spread of influenza [50] (for a review of these mod-
els see [51]). The model describes the dynamics of
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susceptible (S), infected (I), recovered (R), vaccinated
(V), and deceased due to infection (D) populations. In
turn, the infected individuals are divided into two
groups, infected confirmed (IC) and infected uncon-
firmed (IU). The confirmed group represents those indi-
viduals who test positive for influenza in a medical
facility, while the unconfirmed group includes either
asymptomatic individuals, or those whose symptoms are
not severe enough to seek treatment and therefore
never get tested.
Infections are assumed to be caused by an outbreak of
a single influenza viral strain (e.g. pandemic H1N1 of
2009 [52-54]). A small number of individuals become
infected at a time t = t0, referred to herein as the initial
outbreak (e.g. the first H1N1 cases in the town of La
Gloria in Veracruz, Mexico). For simplicity, all indivi-
duals in S are assumed to have an equal susceptibility to
infection; age-related susceptibility and prior immune
history are not considered. Individuals become infected
through homogeneous mixing, at a rate proportional to
the number of contacts between infected and suscepti-
bles. Since several studies have shown a relationship
between the degree of symptoms and the extent of viral
shedding [55-57], we included a parameter, a, to simu-
late potentially reduced infectiousness of those in popu-
lation IU. For most simulations a = 0.5, but using
different values of a did not significantly change the
results (data not shown). The majority of infected
individuals recover at a rate c, which corresponds to a
recovery period of 7 days based on data describing the
progression of symptoms, viral shedding, and cytokine
levels in influenza challenge studies [55,58,59]. Once
recovered, individuals are assumed to have complete
immunity against the virus that does not wane with
time. Complete immunity, along with the fact that births
are not included in the model, means that there is no
continuing supply of susceptibles. Those who recover
and were confirmed are represented by the population
RC, while those who recover but were unconfirmed are
represented by RU. A small number of people do not
recover, however, and instead die as a result of infection,
at a rate δ. The occurrence of deaths in the uncon-
firmed population is not meant to indicate that indivi-
duals may die without ever showing symptoms, but
rather that some individuals may die before seeking
medical attention and officially being classified as
infected with influenza. This is particularly applicable to
developing countries where many people may not have
access to timely medical care. The rate of disease-related
death, δ, is set low in our simulations to reflect a negli-
gible death rate, but this parameter can be adjusted to
simulate epidemics with higher mortality rates. For
quantification purposes, a threshold of n individuals
serves to find the start and end times of an epidemic.
For the simulations presented herein, n = 104 (0.01% of
the total population of 108 people).
Table 1 Parameters used in simulations
Parameter Description Value/Range Source
p probability of being confirmed 0.2 or 0.65 low probability [84,86], high probability [55]
a relative infectiousness of unconfirmed
class
0.5 based on reduced viral shedding [55-57]
ta start of vaccination campaign (day) 20, 50, or 80 set to occur 10, 40, or 70 days after t0
tb end of vaccination campaign (day) Variable depends on campaign start and duration
td depletion of vaccine stockpile (day) Variable depends on stockpile size; see v¯
t0 time of initiating pulse (day) 10 arbitrary
x0 Amplitude of initiating pulse
(individuals)
1 previous epidemiological model [62]
a width of initiating pulse (days) 1 previous epidemiological model [62]
b mean probability of infection per
contact
0.476 or 0.346 adjusted as function of p so R0* = 2.0; see sea-sonal/pandemic R0 values
[1,87]
c rate of recovery (1/days) 1/7 based on symptoms, viral shedding, cytokine levels [55,58,59]
N total population size 108 e.g. Mexico, Phillipines [69,70]
v¯ vaccine stockpile size 30 * 106 based on 30% coverage; see vaccine production/distribution data
[21,60,61]
v¯D maximum number of vaccines per day 10
5 - 107 based on vaccination clinic modeling and clinic data [25-30]
k proportion of eligible vaccinated per
day
0.001 - 0.1 (0.1-
10%)
see models using proportions in this range [17,36,38,44]
δ infection-related death rate (1/days) 10-6 based on U.S. viral surveillance data [88]
*R0: Basic reproduction number, defined as the number of secondary infections occurring due to introduction of 1 infected individual into a susceptible
population (for review see [89])
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Assumptions about vaccination
In addition to acquiring immunity to the virus through
infection, individuals can gain protection through vacci-
nation. As previously explained, it is unrealistic to
assume that only susceptibles will seek and receive vac-
cination during an epidemic. Therefore, in our model
vaccines are distributed to the populations S, IU, and RC.
Individuals from IU and RC are meant to represent those
who become infected, but seek vaccination either
because they are (were) unaware of their illness due to a
lack of symptoms, or because the specific viral strain
causing previously-experienced symptoms was not iden-
tified. As in recovered populations, vaccinated indivi-
duals are assumed to have total protection against the
virus that does not wane. Vaccines that go to individuals
in populations IU and RC are considered wasted, since
immunity was already acquired through infection. We
use the variable VU to keep track of vaccinated indivi-
duals from IU, and VSC to track those vaccinated from
populations S and IC. Importantly, those vaccinated
while belonging to the population IU continue to be
infectious, and recover or die at the same rates as those
who did not receive the vaccine.
The vaccine stockpile, v¯, is limited. For most of the
simulations shown here, it is assumed that v¯ corre-
sponds to a maximal coverage of 30% of the total popu-
lation, a level of supply supported by vaccine production
and distribution data for industrialized nations such as
the U.S. [21,60,61]. The administration of vaccines starts
at some time t = ta and effectively ends in one of two
ways: (1) the vaccination campaign ends after some pre-
scribed duration at time tb, or (2) the stockpile is
depleted at time td.
Model
The dynamics of the model are defined by a system of
non-autonomous ordinary differential equations of the
form
S˙ = −λ(S, I, t) − vS(t), (1)
I˙C = pλ(S, I, t) − (c + δ)IC, (2)
I˙U = (1 − p)λ(S, I, t) − (c + δ)IU − vU(t), (3)
V˙U = vU(t) − (c + δ)VU (4)
R˙C = cIC − vR(t), (5)
R˙U = c(IU + VU), (6)
V˙SC = vS(t) + vR(t). (7)
D˙ = δ(IC + IU + VU), (8)
so the infected, recovered, and vaccinated populations
are given by
I = IC + IU + VU, R = RC + RU , V = VU + VSC. (9)
The new infections per unit time are
λ(S, I, t) = b
S
N
[IC + α (IU + VU)] + φ(t), (10)
where p is the probability of being infected and con-
firmed, c is the rate of recovery of infected individuals
(1/recovery time), δ is the infection-related death rate, b
represents the mean probability of infection per contact.
The function δ(t) defines a small bell-shaped pulse of
the form
φ(t; t0, x0, a) =
x0
a
√
2π
exp
[
− (t − t0)
2
2a2
]
, (11)
that allows the insertion of (possibly more than one)
infected individuals into an otherwise susceptible popu-
lation at a time t0. The parameter x0 can be thought of
as the number of infected individuals in the initial out-
break. The parameter a allows control over the time-
duration of this initial outbreak. The use of this function
adds the convenience of varying the starting point of the
epidemic without assuming there are infected indivi-
duals at time t = 0, thus providing an anchor time
around which vaccination, or other events, can be mea-
sured independently of the initial conditions of the sys-
tem. This property is particularly useful to estimate the
starting time of outbreaks which precede large epi-
demics (e.g. outbreaks in Mexico that preceded the
H1N1 pandemic of 2009 [62]), or to simulate vaccina-
tion campaigns starting in anticipation of outbreaks (e.g.
seasonal influenza or subsequent pandemic waves).
Similar perturbation techniques are commonly used in
computational physiology to simulate stimulation of
excitable cells [63,64]. To ensure that use of the pulse
does not result in negativity, we inserted a condition in
the simulations to set j(t) = 0 whenever
S(t)(1 − bI(t)/N(t)) < x0/(a
√
2π). This control prevents
more individuals from being removed from population S
due to the pulse than are present.
The functions vS(t), vU(t), and vR(t) represent, respec-
tively, expressions for the vaccines given each day to
individuals from the S, IU, and RC populations, and will
be defined in detail in the following section. The total
number of vaccines administered per day is then
vD(t) = vS(t) + vU(t) + vR(t). (12)
Two extra (redundant) variables, W and F, are intro-
duced in the simulations to quantify, respectively, the
Cruz-Aponte et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:207
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/11/207
Page 4 of 16
wasted vaccines (those given to IU and RC) and the
cumulative number of infected individuals (the sum of
all new infections) as a function of time:
W˙ = vU + vR (13)
F˙ = λ(S, I, t) (14)
Proportional and non-proportional vaccination
The strategy adopted in most existing models of vacci-
nation is to choose some constant, k, such that the
number of people vaccinated per day is kx, where x is
the vaccinable population [31-40,43,45-48]. As discussed
earlier, many of these models also assume that vaccines
are only administered to susceptible individuals, thereby
setting the number of vaccinated people per day equal
to kS. We refer to this scheme as the proportional
model of vaccination. However, such a proportion may
represent a very small or large number of people com-
pared to the number of overall vaccines available and
the number that can reasonably be administered in one
day. Instead, we propose modeling vaccination by pla-
cing a limit on the number of daily vaccines before they
are distributed between the epidemiological populations.
We refer to the scheme presented herein as the non-
proportional model of vaccination because the adminis-
tration of vaccines depends on a daily limit, rather than
on a proportion of the population.
Non-proportional vaccination rates
At each time step during the simulations, it is checked
that there were enough vaccines in stock (V(t) < v¯). If
this condition is satisfied, the maximum number of vac-
cines per day, v¯D, is split according to the relative sizes
of the different populations eligible for vaccination. To
do so, we define the weights
wS(t) =
S(t)
M(t)
, wU(t) =
IU(t)
M(t)
, wR(t) =
RC(t)
M(t)
, (15)
where M(t) = S(t) + IU(t) + RC(t) is the total number
of people eligible for vaccination at time t. M is thus a
decreasing function of t satisfying M(t) ≤ N. The maxi-
mum number of vaccines per day that each population
can receive is
v¯S(t) = v¯DwS(t), v¯U(t) = v¯DwU(t), v¯R(t) = v¯DwR(t). (16)
Note that if either S, IU, or RC are zero, their corre-
sponding weight would also be 0, and the maximum
number of vaccines allocated for that population would
be 0 as well.
Depending on the starting day of vaccination, ta, and
on the maximum number of vaccines, v¯D, it is possible
that some days there will be fewer individuals in a given
epidemiological population than v¯x(t), the maximum
number of vaccines available for that population. In
other words, the vaccinable population could become
negative if for x Î {S, IU, RC},x(t) < v¯x(t). To ensure
that x never becomes negative due to the removal of
vaccinated individuals, we assess whether each of these
populations has enough people to be vaccinated at each
step of the simulation. First, we calculate the vaccina-
tion-independent change in x at time t:
f (x, t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
−λ(S, I, t) x = S,
(1 − p)λ(S, I, t) − (c + δ)IU x = IU,
cIC x = RC.
(17)
We use f to estimate xˆ, the size of x(t + h) where h is
the maximum time step of the solver [65], and calculate
the number of administered vaccines, vx(t), based on
this estimate. To ensure the non-negativity of x(t), the
number of vaccinated people removed from x cannot be
larger than xˆ. In other words, the condition vx(t) ≤ xˆ,
must be satisfied so that x(t) ≥ 0 for all t. The number
of vaccines administered per day to population x is then
either: (i) vx(t) = v¯x(t) if xˆ > v¯x(t), or (ii) vx(t) = xˆ if
xˆ ≤ v¯x(t). Note that according to condition (ii), if the
estimated size of the population is zero, then there will
be no vaccines given to that population. More formally,
the number of vaccines administered to population x is
defined as:
vx(t) = max(min
(
v¯x(t), xˆ
)
, 0), x ∈ {S, IU ,RC}. (18)
Eq. (18) results in non-negative values of x(t) for all t
for all x Î {S, IU, RC} if the time step is small enough.
As a rule of thumb, the maximum time step should be
10-3 or smaller.
It follows from Eqs. (16) and (18) that vD(t) ≤ v¯D for
all t. Note that saturation (vD = v¯D) cannot always be
assumed because at some point there may not be
enough individuals eligible for vaccination. This implies
that there will be vaccines available for at least v¯/v¯D
days.
Rationale of comparison between proportional and non-
proportional vaccination
For simplicity, consider an interval of time in which a
population of size x contains no infected individuals,
and assume all individuals are eligible for vaccination. If
vaccines are supplied at the limit of capacity, the daily
number of vaccines is a constant, namely, v¯D. In this
case, the time course of x is described by a decreasing
linear function of the form x(t) = x0 − v¯Dt (Figure 1,
solid line; Figure 2, solid line in right column.) For com-
parison, let k = v¯D/x0 where x0 is the initial size of the
vaccinable population, and assume proportional
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vaccination (x˙ = −kx). The decay in this case will be
exponential at a rate k (Figure 1, dashed line; Figure 2,
dashed line in right column). The difference in the time
courses of these two decays, in particular the slower
decay in the proportional model, may play an important
role in shaping the mitigating effects of vaccination on a
developing epidemic.
Simulations
All numerical solutions of the model were obtained
using Python 2.6 in a Lenovo T400 laptop with an Intel
(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T9600 at 2.8 GHz running
Linux Kubuntu version 11. Simulations were performed
using the solver odeint contained in the Python module
scipy.integrate [66], which uses lsoda from the Fortran
library odepack. The solver uses Adams method for
nonstiff problems, and a method based on backward dif-
ferentiation formulas for stiff problems. In addition,
odeint allows time-step control to test numerical
schemes and precision (simulations not shown). Figures
were produced with the Python module matplotlib [67].
Results
Mitigating effects of vaccination in the proportional and
non-proportional models
Initially, to compare the proportional and non-propor-
tional models of vaccination, we conducted simulations
in which the vaccination campaign lasted 30 days. This
duration can be thought of as defined by constraints in
medical personnel and other factors affecting the admin-
istration of vaccines (eg. pharmaceutical company distri-
bution schedules, operation of health care facilities,
governmental budgets, etc.). Assuming a stockpile
equivalent to 30% of the total population, the distribu-
tion rate in the proportional model is set to 1% of the
vaccinable population per day (k = 0.01). Equivalently,
the maximum daily administration in the non-propor-
tional model is then 106 vaccines (v¯D = 106). Figure 2
shows the infected, vaccinated, and vaccinables as func-
tions of time for vaccination campaigns starting at three
different times relative to the initial outbreak (t0 = 10):
(1) 10 days after t0 (ta = 20), so that the entire campaign
occurs well before the epidemic starts (Figure 2a, b), (2)
40 days after t0 (ta = 50), so the campaign ends shortly
before the start of the epidemic (Figure 2c, d); and (3)
70 days after t0 (ta = 80), in which case the campaign is
ongoing as the epidemic begins (Figure 2e, f). These
campaign start times correspond to real-world scenarios.
Early vaccination, as in campaign (1), is possible if a vac-
cine is already available and outbreaks are anticipated, as
might be the case with seasonal influenza or with addi-
tional epidemic waves caused by a previously identified
viral strain. Vaccination following detection of an out-
break, but before epidemic levels are reached (2), is
again possible if a vaccine is available and efficient dis-
ease surveillance systems are present. However, if the
surveillance system is not able to identify small out-
breaks, or a vaccine is not immediately available, vacci-
nation may not be implemented until after the epidemic
starts (3).
The dynamics shown in Figure 2 reveal a number of
similarities and differences between the proportional
and non-proportional models of vaccination, which in
turn depend on interactions between the start time and
duration of the vaccination campaign, and the limita-
tions on daily administration. During the early stages of
vaccination, the rate of increase in the proportion of
vaccinated individuals in the population is equivalent in
the two models, as is the rate of decrease in the propor-
tion of vaccinable people (Figure 2b, d, f). As time pro-
ceeds, however, the rate of vaccination in the
proportional model slows down, while the rate in the
non-proportional model holds fairly steady. Due to the
duration of the campaign and the daily rate of adminis-
tration, the campaign ends before the stockpile is
depleted, and the proportional model does not have
time to ‘catch up’ to the non-proportional model.
Therefore, by the end of the campaign, a larger propor-
tion of the population has been vaccinated in the non-
proportional model. This increased vaccination coverage
causes the epidemic in the non-proportional model to
develop more slowly, increasing its duration, but
Figure 1 Proportional and non-proportional decay of the
vaccinable population. Proportional decay (dashed line) is given
by x(t) = x0e
-kt, for k = 0.1. Non-proportional decay (solid line) is
given by x(t) = x0 − v¯Dt, where v¯D = kx0.
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ultimately resulting in a smaller and later peak in com-
parison to the proportional model (Figure 2a, c, e). The
differences between the two models, with respect to the
time course and severity of the epidemics, are largest
when vaccination begins around the time of the initial
outbreak (t0) and ends well before the epidemic hits
(Figure 2a). As described previously, these differences
are directly attributable to the increased number of vac-
cines administered in the non-proportional, relative to
the proportional, model (Figure 2b). If vaccination
occurs early, then the majority of those vaccinated are
from population S, and therefore an increased level of
coverage in the non-proportional model has a measur-
able effect on the epidemic development and size.
Instead, if vaccination begins 40 days after t0 and the
campaign ends shortly before the epidemic starts, the
differences between the epidemics produced by the two
models, especially with respect to the time course, are
smaller (Figure 2c). Again, the proportion of people vac-
cinated in the non-proportional model is larger than in
the proportional (Figure 2d). However, since vaccination
begins some time after the initial introduction of
infected individuals into the susceptible population,
some of the additional vaccinated individuals in the
non-proportional model are from populations IU and
RC. In other words, the increased coverage in the non-
proportional model has less of a mitigating effect when
vaccination starts later because fewer of the vaccinated
people are susceptibles. Finally, if vaccination begins 70
days after t0 and is ongoing as the epidemic starts, the
number of vaccinated individuals from populations IU
and RC is now even greater, essentially diluting the
effect of the increased coverage in the non-proportional
model (Figure 2f) further. Therefore, the models pro-
duce epidemics which are very similar in their time
course, and differ primarily in their peak size (Figure
2e).
We also compared the proportional and non-propor-
tional models when the same total number of vaccines
was administered in each. This was accomplished by
setting the campaign duration and daily administration
limits such that all the vaccines in the stockpile were
used. In this way, the same level of coverage is achieved,
though the proportional model always takes longer to
reach this level due to slowing of the administration
rate over time. As long as vaccination occurs early,
before the number of infections increases substantially,
the additional time needed for the proportional model
Figure 2 Effects of vaccination in the proportional and non-proportional models for different campaign starts. The proportional model
is represented by dashed black lines and the non-proportional model by solid black lines. The graphs in the left column (a, c, e) show the
proportion of infected people as a function of time. The graphs in the right column (b, d, f) show the proportion of the population vaccinated,
and those still eligible for vaccination (vaccinable), over time. The initial population size is 108 people. Infected individuals are inserted into the
susceptible population with a pulse on day 10 (t0 = 10; solid vertical gray line). The vaccination campaign is initiated on day 20 (a, b), 50 (c, d),
or 80 (e, f), and lasts 28 days. Start (ta)and stop (tb) times of the campaign are indicated by dashed vertical lines. Vaccination occurs at a rate of
1% of the eligible population per day (proportional; k = 0.01), or at a maximum of 106 vaccines per day (non-proportional, v¯D = 106).
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to administer the whole stockpile has a minimal effect
on the final coverage in the susceptible population.
Thus, the epidemics produced by the two models are
nearly identical (Additional File 1). However, if vaccina-
tion does not begin until after the epidemic is underway,
the increasing number of infections over time starts to
affect the level of coverage achieved in S. The slower
rate of administration in the proportional model results
in an increased number of susceptibles at certain times
during the epidemic, relative to the non-proportional
model. This increased susceptibility results in a slightly
faster epidemic development than is seen in the non-
proportional model (Additional File 1e), and occurs
despite the fact that the final number of vaccines admi-
nistered is the same for both models.
Additional simulations revealed similar results for sev-
eral combinations of campaign duration and daily
administration limit (see subsequent section for more
details). In general, if the campaign ends before the vac-
cine stockpile is depleted, more vaccines are always
administered in the non-proportional model, and the
epidemics produced by the two models are different
with respect to timing and severity. Instead, if the same
total number of vaccines is administered in each model,
the epidemics do not differ unless vaccination begins
very late.
Comparison of the models for variable daily
administration and campaign duration
To further explore in both models the effects of chan-
ging the timing of the vaccination campaign, we system-
atically varied ta under three different scenarios of daily
administration capacity and campaign duration. These
three scenarios can be thought of as ranging from ‘con-
servative’ to ‘aggressive’ in terms of the number of vac-
cines administered within a given time period, and are
as follows: (1) a 56 day campaign vaccinating 0.1% (pro-
portional) or a maximum of 105 vaccines (non-propor-
tional) per day; (2) a 28 day campaign vaccinating 1% or
a maximum of 106 vaccines per day; (3) a 3 day cam-
paign vaccinating 10% or a maximum of 107 vaccines
per day. For each of these combinations of campaign
duration and daily administration limit, the non-propor-
tional model administers a larger total number of vac-
cines than the proportional model. The data obtained
from these simulations were used to calculate the final
size, peak size, time to peak, and epidemic duration as a
function of the difference between ta and t0.
The conservative campaign (1) results in no detectable
differences between the proportional and non-propor-
tional models on any quantified measure (Figure 3a1-
a4). Under this low level of daily administration, the
decay in the vaccinable population is very slow in both
models and there is not time for the decay rates to
diverge before the campaign ends. The level of vaccina-
tion coverage in both models is therefore the same and
in turn, the number of susceptible people that get
infected over time is very similar. In addition, because
so few people are vaccinated overall, the mitigating
effects of vaccination are minimal and each measure
varies little as a function of the timing of the vaccination
campaign (ta - t0). Late vaccination start times caused
the peak and final size to increase, and the peak time
and epidemic duration to decrease, but only marginally.
Though the models behave similarly when examined
under the conservative vaccination regime, the moderate
regime (2), equivalent to the campaign used for the
simulations in Figure 2, reveals important differences
between the models on all four measures (Figure 3b1-
b4). For early vaccination starts, final and peak sizes are
smaller, while peak times and epidemic durations are
larger, in the non-proportional than the proportional
model. As discussed previously, these differences result
from the higher level of vaccine coverage achieved in
the non-proportional, relative to the proportional,
model. With later vaccination starts, due to the increas-
ing number of vaccinated individuals from populations
IU and RC, the differences between the models decrease
until the models converge on most measures. Interest-
ingly, with respect to epidemic duration, the two models
not only converge, but reverse their respective relation-
ship; epidemic durations are slightly smaller in the non-
proportional model for very late vaccination start times
(Figure 3b4). For the aggressive campaign (3), the pro-
portional and non-proportional models also differ with
respect to the time course and severity of epidemics
(Figure 3c1-c4). The differences are the same as those
seen under the moderate vaccination regime, namely
smaller final and peak sizes, and larger peak times and
epidemic durations, in the non-proportional model. The
same relationship is also observed between the magni-
tude of these differences and the timing of the vaccina-
tion campaign relative to the initial outbreak. Later
vaccination start times result in a convergence of the
proportional and non-proportional models on all
measures.
We also performed these same simulations for differ-
ent combinations of campaign duration and daily
administration limit. The vaccination scenarios are as
follows: (1) a 300 day campaign vaccinating 0.1% (pro-
portional) or a maximum of 105 vaccines (non-propor-
tional) per day; (2) a 35 day campaign vaccinating 1% or
a maximum of 106 vaccines per day; (3) a 5 day cam-
paign vaccinating 10% or a maximum of 107 vaccines
per day. Under these conditions, the vaccine stockpile is
depleted before the end of the campaign, resulting in
the same number of vaccines being administered in
each model. The epidemics produced by the two models
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Figure 3 Effects of vaccination in the two models for different administration rates and campaign durations. Epidemic measures are
shown for proportional (open circles) and non-proportional (filled dots) models. Final size, peak size, peak time, and epidemic duration are
plotted as a function of the difference between the vaccination start time (ta) and the onset of the initial outbreak (t0; solid gray line). The
vaccination campaign durations and daily administration rates are as follows: (1) 56 day campaign with k = 0.001 (proportional) or v¯D = 105
(non-proportional) (a1-a4), (2) 28 day campaign with k = 0.01 or v¯D = 106(b1-b4), and (3) 3 day campaign with k = 0.1 or v¯D = 107(c1-c4).
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are thus not measurably different, as previously
explained, except for the latest vaccination start times
under the moderate regime (Additional File 2).
Effects of non-proportional vaccination for different levels
of population coverage
Finally, we investigated the mitigating effects of vaccina-
tion in the non-proportional model when different tar-
get levels of total population coverage are met at
different times relative to the initial outbreak. All simu-
lations shown previously assume a maximum of 30%
population coverage due to the size of the stockpile
(v¯ = 30 × 106). To simulate vaccination campaigns with
higher levels of coverage, we increased v¯ to a size
equivalent to 20, 40, 60, or 80% of the population. In
addition, since the effective coverage in the susceptible
population could be altered if a large number of vac-
cines go to infected unconfirmed individuals, we per-
formed the same simulations for p = 0.2 or p = 0.65
(the value used in all previous simulations). In other
words, unconfirmed cases represent either 80% or 35%
of total infections, respectively. The probability of infec-
tion per contact is adjusted so that the basic
reproductive number (R0) is the same in both simula-
tions. Figure 4 shows the proportion infected over time
when 20% (a, e, i), 40% (b, f, j), 60% (c, g, k), or 80% (d,
h, l) of the population is vaccinated with a maximum of
106 vaccines per day. The vaccination campaign starts
10 (Figure 4, left column), 40 (middle column), or 70
days (right column) after the initial oubreak at day t0 =
10. Vaccination ends when the target level of coverage
is achieved i.e. the higher the coverage, the longer the
campaign.
The results show that even if 20% of the population is
vaccinated, there is still a sizeable epidemic (Figure 4a,
e, i). Furthermore, starting vaccination earlier does not
dramatically decrease the number of infections, though
it does delay the start of the epidemic. At 40% coverage,
the number of infections is highly dependent on when
the vaccination campaign begins (Figure 4b, f, j). When
vaccination starts only 10 days after the pulse, it suc-
cessfully prevents an epidemic from occurring (Figure
4b). A start time of 30 days later does not prevent a
small number of late-occurring infections, but is still a
highly effective mitigation strategy (Figure 4f). A full-
blown epidemic does occur if vaccination starts as late
Figure 4 Effects of vaccination in the non-proportional model given different levels of population coverage. Simulations were
performed using the non-proportional model of vaccination with v¯D = 106. The pulse inserting infected individual(s) into the susceptible
population occurs at t0 = 10 (gray solid vertical lines). The proportion of people infected over time is plotted for vaccination start times, ta = 20
(a-d), ta = 50 (e-h), and ta = 80 (i-l). Start times are indicated with dashed lines in each panel. The target level of vaccination coverage in the
total population varies between 20% and 80%, as indicated. Dotted lines mark the end of the vaccination campaign when the target coverage
level is reached. The probability of being confirmed, p, is set at either 0.20 (thick gray lines) or 0.65 (thin black lines), and b adjusted accordingly
such that R0 = 2.0 for all simulations. Note that the gray and black lines overlap. The inset in panel (i) illustrates the change in the epidemic
dynamics at the time vaccination ends.
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as 70 days after the initial outbreak, but the peak size is
smaller than that observed with only 20% coverage (Fig-
ure 4j). At 60% coverage the results of vaccination are
similar, though even more effective (Figure 4c, g, k).
Starting vaccination 10 or 40 days after the pulse com-
pletely quells the outbreak (Figure 4c, g), while begin-
ning 70 days later does not prevent a small, but short,
epidemic from occurring (Figure 4k). Increasing cover-
age from 60% to 80% does not confer much additional
benefit with respect to either arrival, size, or time course
of the epidemic (Figure 4d, h, l), but does result in a lar-
ger number of wasted vaccines (Additional File 3). The
results are similar for the two values of p for all simula-
tions, regardless of the level of coverage or the vaccina-
tion start time. In other words, increasing the
proportion of unconfirmed cases does not alter the miti-
gating effects of vaccination. Decreasing the value of p,
and thereby increasing the number of vaccines going to
population IU, increases the number of wasted vaccines
only slightly (Additional File 3). Thus, for the parameter
choices made here, the majority of wasted vaccines go
to population RC, and changing the number going to IU
does not significantly change the level of coverage in S.
Discussion
Epidemiological models can be vital tools for govern-
ment and medical professionals who need to understand
the spread of diseases and the effects of mitigating stra-
tegies, such as vaccination, to form public policies that
will help reduce the burden of disease [9,68]. These
models are only useful, however, if they generate accu-
rate predictions and the tools they provide can be
applied to real situations. We argue that many epide-
miological models examining the mitigating effects of
vaccination incorporate a number of unrealistic assump-
tions. These include: (1) large vaccine stockpiles, (2)
vaccination of only the susceptible class, and (3) the
administration of vaccines based on a proportion of the
population, without taking into account daily adminis-
tration constraints. We constructed a model designed to
incorporate more realistic assumptions about the supply
and distribution of vaccines.
Vaccine stockpile size
We placed a conservative, but reasonable, limit on the
total number of vaccines available at 30 ×106; enough to
cover 30% of the population. A stockpile covering this
percentage of the population is in agreement with seaso-
nal influenza vaccine production and distribution for
resource-rich countries, such as the U.S. [21,60,61].
From 2000 to 2009, the number of seasonal vaccines
produced annually for use in the U.S. did not exceed
140.6 million (~46% of the total population of 307 mil-
lion [69,70]), and in most years was far less at an
average of 99.7 million (~32%) [60]. Even Canada, with
the largest per capita annual influenza vaccine distribu-
tion of all countries surveyed, distributed only enough
vaccines as of 2003 to cover ~34% of their population
[21]. For many other countries in the world, annual vac-
cine supplies are nowhere near enough to cover 30% of
their population, primarily due to the lack of vaccine
production capabilities and the resources needed to buy
vaccines from producing countries [20-22,24]. As of
2003, over 60% of the total influenza vaccines distribu-
ted annually went to countries comprising only 12% of
the world population, leaving 88% of the world facing
potential vaccine shortages [20,21].
In 2009, the emergence of a novel influenza A (H1N1)
strain [52-54] tested the world’s ability to rapidly
develop and distribute large numbers of vaccines to
combat an ongoing pandemic [71,72]. Though vaccine
development was quick and successful, production levels
fell far short of initital estimates [72], and even devel-
oped countries struggled to secure sufficient vaccines to
cover their populations before subsequent waves hit
[54,73,74]. By the time the fall wave peaked in the U.S.
in mid October, only ~10 million vaccines were avail-
able [74]; Canada had distributed less than 6 million
vaccines [75] when their second wave peaked just a few
weeks later [73,76]. It wasn’t until mid December 2009
that the number of vaccines available in the U.S.
reached levels high enough to cover 30% of the popula-
tion [74]. Canada had enough vaccines by the first week
of December to cover a larger percentage of their popu-
lation (~67%) [75], but were subsequently accused of
wasting resources as most vaccines arrived too late to
have an effect during the peak periods of influenza
activity [73,77]. For developing nations the situation was
much worse [54,62,72]. For example, the Mexican gov-
ernment indicated in June of 2009 that they would have
30 million H1N1 vaccines (enough to cover ~30% of the
population) [62,78,79]. Yet, three waves of infection had
already hit by the time the first 650 thousand vaccines
arrived in late November [62]. By December 1, 2009 the
global production of H1N1 vaccines had reached 534
million, enough to cover only ~8% of the world popula-
tion [72]. Many developing countries did not have any
vaccines until January 2010 [72]. The production and
distribution of seasonal and pandemic vaccines show
that stockpiles assumed in many models are in excess of
what is usually available. Some studies modeling vacci-
nation in simulated U.S. populations have considered
upper limits of 300-400 million vaccines (100%+ cover-
age) [31,33]; levels more than double the U.S. annual
production [60] and close to the global production of
seasonal influenza vaccines [61,72,80]. Other models
looking at vaccination during a pandemic have assumed
population coverage levels as high as 70-90%
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[32,34,35,38,39,81], levels not achieved by many wealthy
nations during the most recent pandemic, and currently
out of reach for most developing nations [20-22,24].
In 2004, the WHO published two separate reports on
guidelines for vaccine use during a pandemic [9] and
pandemic preparedness in countries with limited
resources [82]. In both reports, they remarked on the
usefulness of mathematical models for examining differ-
ent pandemic scenarios and the effectiveness of strate-
gies, such as vaccination, in mitigating outbreaks [9,82].
However, they lamented that, “...no scenarios appropri-
ate to developing countries are readily available” (see
[9], pg. 5), a sentiment echoed by others [22]. In 2005, a
model of a developing country in Southeast Asia, Thai-
land, was used to examine vaccination strategies in the
context of an avian influenza epidemic [32]. To realisti-
cally model factors such as age and household-size dis-
tributions, and population mixing, they relied on census
data from the Thai government and social network stu-
dies of Thai communities. Yet, they assumed that vacci-
nation coverage in the population of 500 thousand
people was 50-70%, equivalent to a total of 250-350
thousand vaccines [32]. Between 2000 and 2003, a total
of 64-253 thousand vaccines were distributed to the
entire WHO-defined region of Southeast Asia with a
population of over 1.5 million [20,21]. Specifically in
Thailand, between 1997 and 2003 the number of vac-
cines distributed per capita was ~1 per 1000 people
(0.1% coverage) [20,21]. Thus, the crucial detail of set-
ting a limit on the vaccine stockpile that was realistic
for Thailand was neglected in the model.
Though many of the parameters in our model listed in
Table 1 including vaccine stockpile, were set to values
observed mostly for developed countries, the model is
easily adjusted to apply to developing countries. The
size of the stockpile, v¯, can be set to correspond to very
low levels of population coverage.
In these cases, we would expect to see that vaccination
campaigns would have less of a mitigating effect, result-
ing in larger epidemics with earlier time to peak than
the simulations shown here. However, it should be
noted that the general results regarding the comparison
between the proportional and non-proportional models
still hold for a wide range of stockpile sizes.
The vaccine stockpile can also be increased to model
the effects of increasing population coverage, as done
for the simulations in Figure 4. As expected, we find
that increasing the percentage of the population pro-
tected by vaccination decreases the size and duration,
and delays the arrival, of the epidemic. At only 40% cov-
erage the epidemic can be completely prevented, if vac-
cination begins early enough. Even vaccination
beginning around the start of the epidemic can help sig-
nificantly to control the number of infections. However,
if vaccination cannot begin sooner than this time, it is
important to note that increasing coverage from 60% to
80% in our simulations does not further decrease the
size or duration of the epidemic. Therefore, continuing
campaigns during an epidemic until 80% of the popula-
tion is vaccinated may result in a large number of vac-
cines being wasted in return for little benefit (Additional
File 3).
Vaccination of multiple epidemiological populations
In our model, not only susceptible individuals, but also
unconfirmed infected and confirmed recovered people,
are eligible for vaccination. There is little documentation
about the actual number of unconfirmed and recovered
people who do get vaccinated. However, in the context
of the 2009 H1N1 vaccination campaigns, the CDC
recommended that those who had influenza-like symp-
toms (i.e. recovered) should still get vaccinated, if medi-
cally indicated, due to uncertainty about which specific
viral strain caused the illness [83]. In addition, they sta-
ted that even in those cases when infection by 2009
H1N1 had been confirmed by laboratory testing, it was
an individual’s choice as to whether to receive vaccina-
tion. Thus, recovered people, even those who were pre-
viously symptomatic and confirmed, can seek and
receive vaccination. In this respect, the eligible popula-
tion in our model is reasonable.
Expanding vaccine administration to include the
unconfirmed population, in particular, also allowed us
to examine the role that a high rate of asymptomatic
cases might play in the context of vaccination efforts
[42]. This is particularly relevant for 2009 H1N1, which
was reported by some as characterized by a large pro-
portion of asymptomatic cases [84]. However, in our
simulations, decreasing the probability of being con-
firmed, p, from 0.65 to 0.20 does not alter the mitigating
effects of vaccination (Figure 4). The majority of wasted
vaccines in our model go to the confirmed recovered
population (Additional File 3) so that the number of
vaccines going to the unconfirmed class does not signifi-
cantly change the level of coverage in the susceptible
population. Larger effects may be seen when the vaccine
stockpile is severely limited, as could be the case for
developing countries.
Limited number of vaccines administered per day
The key observation prompting the development of the
model presented here was that most existing models of
vaccination of which we are aware distribute vaccines
based on a proportion of the eligible population
[31-40,43-48]. Considering that vaccination clinics oper-
ate with a finite number of medical professionals for a
finite number of hours, however, it is clear that distribu-
tion happens in practice based on the number of
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vaccines that can be administered per day [25-30]. Pan-
demic prepareness plans devised by county health
departments often calculate the necessary length of vac-
cination campaigns using a formula based on daily
administration capacity (e.g. see [28]). Therefore, we
model vaccination by placing a limit on the number of
daily vaccines (non-proportional model).
Initially, to compare the proportional and non-propor-
tional models of vaccination we assumed that the daily
limit was 106 vaccines (a value corresponding to 1% of
the population). A number of resources discuss the
administration capabilites needed to distribute specific
numbers of vaccines [25-30]. For example, a model by
Aaby et al. [25] predicted that 316 people could be vac-
cinated per hour with the aid of 18 nurses. Thus, one
clinic operating for 8 hours could vaccinate 2,528 people
per day. To reach a daily administration of 106 vaccines
would therefore require more than 395 clinics and more
than 7,110 nurses (or other capable medical profes-
sionals). Similarly, estimates from the CDC are that a
single vaccinator at a station can administer 30 vaccines
per hour. With 16 hours of operation and 4-8 stations,
one clinic could administer 1,900-5,000 vaccines per
day. At this rate, it would require 200-526 clinics and
1,600-8,416 vaccinators to distribute 106 vaccines per
day. Data from actual vaccination clinics reveal a similar
story. In 2004, a mass vaccination clinic in Maryland
administered vaccines to more than 3,000 people in a
single day with a workforce of 36 nurses, and 38 addi-
tional staff. Thus, to reach 106 vaccines per day would
have required more than 333 clinics, nearly 12,000
nurses, and over 12,654 additional workers. Based on all
these estimates, if instead a daily rate of 107 vaccines
(10% of the population) is desired, the clinics and staff
needed would increase to the thousands and hundreds
of thousands, respectively. For these reasons, we set 107
(10%) as the upper limit of daily administration.
In some nations, where the medical resources are suf-
ficient and the infrastructure is present, high daily rates
of vaccine administration may be possible. Even so,
mass vaccination campaigns often require extensive
planning and agency cooperation to carry out
[27-29,74], and are not intended to be sustained for
long periods of time. In addition, long campaigns at
high rates of daily administration would require very
large vaccine stockpiles. Therefore, we limited high daily
administration (107 or 10%) campaigns to a small num-
ber of days (≤5). For many developing nations with
minimal resources, however, daily vaccine administra-
tion capacity is much more limited [22]. To model the
mitigating effects of vaccination in these nations the
daily administration limit, v¯D, is easily lowered in the
model to reflect the medical facilities, workforce, and
other resources available.
Comparison of models in context of total vaccines
administered
We predicted, based on the solutions of the equations
representing the proportional and non-proportional
models, that the different decays in the vaccinable popu-
lation (Figure 1), would lead to distinct epidemic
dynamics. This prediction was confirmed under several
vaccination scenarios in which the campaign duration
and daily administration limit were such that vaccina-
tion ended before the stockpile was depleted (Figure 2
and Figure 3). Under such conditions, the non-propor-
tional model always administers a larger total number of
vaccines, which results in smaller and later, but some-
times longer, epidemics than in the proportional model.
This is true for both moderate and high levels of daily
vaccine administration, and is more pronounced the
sooner vaccination starts after the initial outbreak.
If instead vaccination continues until the stockpile is
depleted, the same total number of vaccines are admi-
nistered in each model, and the epidemics produced are
very similar in time course and severity (Additional Files
1, 2). The only differences between the two models in
these cases are seen under the moderate regime when
vaccination starts after the epidemic hits. Then, the
slower rate of vaccine administration in the proportional
model means that there is a small increase in the sus-
ceptiblity of the population during the epidemic, which
results in a slightly faster and more severe epidemic
than in the non-proportional model. In contrast, at low
daily rates of administration, the models do not differ
much on any measure, regardless of whether the same
total number of vaccines in administered. This occurs
because so few people are vaccinated per day that the
proportional and non-proportional decays in the vaccin-
able population do not have time to diverge. Thus, the
models achieve the same level of vaccine coverage even
if the stockpile is not depleted.
Difference in epidemic duration
One of the largest differences between the two models
when different total numbers of vaccines are adminis-
tered is the epidemic duration. This stems from the
increased coverage of the population in the non-propor-
tional model, which allows the epidemic to develop
more slowly, but can also cause it to last tens of days
longer than predicted by the proportional model. Inter-
estingly, a similar effect was found in an agent-based
model of influenza (for a review of these types of mod-
els see [85]). Hartvigsen et al. [81] showed that for cer-
tain schemes of connectivity between the agents
(individuals), increasing vaccination coverage from 0%
through ~30% increased the epidemic duration; an effect
that occurred due to slowing of the epidemic develop-
ment. Having the benefit of a smaller, delayed peak
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could therefore come at a cost, since it could result in a
sustained burden on the healthcare system. Models that
make more accurate predictions about the length of epi-
demics will allow health care professionals and medical
facilities to prepare accordingly.
Conclusions
We developed a model to explore the mitigating effects
of vaccination on influenza outbreaks. We argue that
our model constitutes a theoretical improvement over
existing models, with advantages that include data-
informed parameter choices, vaccination of multiple epi-
demiological classes, a reasonable vaccine stockpile, lim-
its on the number of vaccines administered per day, and
ways to estimate wasted resources. In particular, the
non-proportional vaccine administration implemented
in our model may provide more accurate predictions of
the mitigating effects of vaccination than proportional
models, particularly when moderate or high levels of
daily administration are considered. In addition, supply
and daily administration capacity can be adjusted to
study vaccination strategies in developing nations with
limited resources. Government and medical officials can
also use the tools provided here to create influenza pre-
paredness plans for specific communities based on their
available resources.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Comparison of the proportional and non-
proportional models when the stockpile is depleted. The
proportional model is represented by dashed black lines and the non-
proportional model by solid black lines. The graphs in the left column (a,
c, e) show the proportion of infected people as a function of time. The
graphs in the right column (b, d, f) show the proportion of the
population vaccinated, and those still eligible for vaccination (vaccinable),
over time. The initial population size is 108 people. Infected individuals
are inserted into the susceptible population with a pulse on day 10 (t0 =
10; solid vertical gray line). The vaccination campaign is initiated on day
20 (a, b), 50 (c, d), or 80 (e, f), and lasts 40 days such that all the
vaccines are used in both models. Start (ta)and stop (tb) times of the
campaign are indicated by dashed vertical lines. Vaccination occurs at a
rate of 1% of the eligible population per day (proportional; k = 0.01), or
at a maximum of 106 vaccines per day (non-proportional, v¯D = 106).
Additional file 2: Effects of vaccination for administration rates and
campaign durations resulting in stockpile depletion. Epidemic
measures are shown for proportional (open circles) and non-proportional
(filled dots) models. Final size, peak size, peak time, and epidemic
duration are plotted as a function of the difference between the
vaccination start time (ta) and the onset of the initial outbreak (t0; solid
gray line). The vaccination campaign durations and daily administration
rates are as follows: (1) 300 day campaign with k = 0.001 (proportional)
or v¯D = 105 (non-proportional) (a1-a4), (2) 40 day campaign with k =
0.01 or v¯D = 106 (b1-b4), and (3) 5 day campaign with k = 0.1 or
v¯D = 107(c1-c4).
Additional file 3: Wasted vaccines for different population coverage
levels, vaccination start times, and proportion of unconfirmed
cases. Simulations were performed using the non-proportional model of
vaccination with v¯D = 106. The pulse inserting infected individual(s)
into the susceptible population occurs at t0 = 10 (gray solid vertical
lines). The proportion of vaccines wasted over time is plotted for
vaccination start times, ta = 20 (a-d), ta = 50 (e-h), and ta = 80 (i-l). Start
times are indicated with dashed lines in each panel. The target level of
vaccination coverage in the total population varies between 20% and
80%, as indicated. Dotted lines mark the end of the vaccination
campaign when the target coverage level is reached. The probability of
being confirmed, p, is set at either 0.20 (thick gray lines) or 0.65 (thin
black lines), and b adjusted accordingly such that R0 = 2.0 for all
simulations.
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